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CRIMINAL LAW-Statement Inadmissible Against a Defendant in the Prosecution's Case in Chief Because of Lack
of the Procedural Safeguards Required by Miranda v. Arizona, May, if Its Trustworthiness Satisfies Legal Standards,
Be Used for Impeachment Purposes to Attack the Credibility of the Defendant's Trial Testimony.
Viven Harris was charged, in a two count indictment, with selling
heroin to a New York City undercover police officer on January 4
and 6, 1966. Following his arrest on January 7 and in the course of
an interrogation in the office of the Assistant District Attorney, without being advised of his right to appointed counsel as prescribed by
Escobedo v. Illinois' and Miranda v. Arizona,2 Harris made several
incriminating statements.
At his trial the defendant, Harris, took the stand and on direct examination denied a sale of narcotics to the undercover agent on January 4. Harris did admit making a sale of the contents of a glassine
bag to the officer on January 6; however, Harris claimed that he was
attempting to defraud the purchaser since baking soda, not heroin,
was contained in the bag.
Over the defense counsel's objection the court permitted the prosecution to question the defendant, on cross examination, as to whether on
January 7, following his arrest, he had made certain statements to the
District Attorney, statements which partially contradicted his previous
testimony on direct questioning. 3 In the course of this cross questioning the prosecution read to Harris, seriatim, his statement of January 7.
The trial judge carefully instructed the jury that the statement attributed
to Harris by the prosecution could be considered only in passing on
Harris' credibility as a witness. (It was conceded by the prosecution
that the Miranda decision made Viven Harris' statement of January 7,
1. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
2.

384 U.S. 436 (1966).

3. At the pre-trial interrogation, Harris stated that:

1) On January 4, 1966 he

acted as the undercover police officer's agent in obtaining narcotics, and 2) On January 6, 1966 he obtained narcotics from an unknown person outside a bar and then sold

the drugs to the undercover agent in a bar.
dicted by Harris' trial testimony.

These pre-trial statements were contra-
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inadmissible in the case in chief.) The jury disagreed as to the
count relating to January 4, 1966, but found Harris guilty of the second count, and the court sentenced him to 6-8 years in prison. The
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 4 and the New York
Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the conviction."
On Harris' petition, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 6 to consider whether a confession acquired without the benefit of
the "Miranda warnings" may be used for the purpose of impeaching
the defendant-witness' credibility. In Harris v. New York,' the Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, answered this question affirmatively."
This comment, in addition to recounting the principal points developed within the majority and dissenting opinions in Harris, will briefly
sketch the dominant stages in the development, prior to Harris, of the
exclusionary rule and the rule's impeachment exception. The comment
then will take up a dicussion of what effects are likely to follow from
the Harrisdecision.
THE MAJORITY'S OPINION
Mr. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority in Harris,develops
within his opinion principally three points, to wit: 1) that Miranda v.
Arizona is not controlling of the issue in Harris; 2) that Walder v.
United States,9 although factually distinguishable, nevertheless, announces the applicable principle of law for the Harris case; and 3)
that the privilege afforded an accused person, to testify in his own defense, does not include the privilege to commit perjury.
The Harris majority interpreted as dicta the language contained in
the Miranda opinion, suggesting that a confession acquired without the
benefit of the "Miranda warnings" may not be used for impeachment
purposes at trial; 10 accordingly, it was determined that the Miranda
4. People v. Harris, 31 App. Div. 2d 828, 298 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1969).
While a
majority of the court believed that impeachment should be permitted only on collateral
matters, they nevertheless found the error to have been harmless. Two judges dis-

sented, rejecting the harmless error conclusion.

Two other judges, in a separate opin-

ion, believed that such impeachment should be permitted as to both collateral and di-

rect matters.
5. People v. Harris, 25 N.Y.2d 175, 250 N.E.2d 349, 303 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1969).
6. Cert. granted, 39 U.S. 937 (1970) (No. 1022).
7. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
8. Chief Justice Burger, who announced the majority opinion, was joined by Justices White, Harlan, Blackmun and Stewart. Justice Black dissented. Justice Brennan
filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Marshall and Douglas joined.
9. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
10. Miranda stated that "statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the de-
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holding did not proscribe the use of an otherwise inadmissible confession for the sole purpose of discrediting the defendant's integrity as
a witness, provided "that the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies
legal standards."'"
Upon refusing to accept Miranda as dispositive of the issue in Harris, the Court instead chose to adhere to a precedent established in
Walder v. United States. 2 There the prosecution was permitted to use
illegally seized physical evidence, which was acquired in a previous
prosecution, to impeach the credibility of the defendant as to matters
in his testimony, which were collateralto the case against him."
However, unlike Walder, the essence of the testimony in Harris,
which was the target of the impeachment weapon, pertained to matters
which had a direct bearing upon elements of the crime with which the
defendant was charged. 1 4 Yet this "collateral-direct" dissimilarity did
not impress the Harrismajority and was summarily dealt with:
It is true that Walder was impeached as to collateral matters included in his direct examination, whereas petitioner here was impeached as to testimony bearing more directly upon the crimes
charged. We are not persuaded that there is a difference in
principle that warrants a result different from that reached by the
court in Walder.1 5
Similar cursory consideration was given to the argument that any
impeachment exception to the Miranda rule of exclusion would breed
a number of illicit police interrogations designed solely to extract a
possible confession for purposes of impeachment. In the words of the
Chief Justice, "the benefits of the impeachment process should not be
lost because of the speculative possibility that impermissible police conduct will be encouraged thereby."'" The Harris majority felt that sufficient deterrence flows when the evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case-in-chief.
fendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial ....

These statements are

incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without full
warnings and effective waiver required for any other statement." 384 U.S. at 477.
11. 401 U.S. at 224.
12. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
13. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE criticizes Walder both on constitutional grounds and for
violating "the evidential rule prohibiting contradiction on a collateral matter." 1 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, Section 15, at 65 (3d ed. Supp. 1962). Apparently the question of
collateralness was not considered by the Court. This objection, however, would not be
applicable to Harris where the contradiction related to testimony on matters which had
a direct bearing on an element of the crime.
14. Furthermore, in Harris,unlike in Walder, the impeachment evidence, viz. a confession, was acquired during the investigation of the very case then presently being tried.
The Court apparently deemed this distinction insignificant since it was not dealt with
by the Harrismajority.
15. 401 U.S. at 225. (Emphasis added)
16. Id.
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Chief Justice Burger's final remarks are revealing of the Harris majority's preeminent concern:
[Although] [e]very criminal defendant is privileged to testify in
his own defense, or to refuse to do so . . . . [t]hat privilege cannot
be construed to include the right to commit perjury . . . [Hence]

[t]he shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a lifrom the risk of
cense to use perjury by way of a defense, free
17
confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.
THE DISSENT

Mr. Justice Brennan wrote the only dissenting opinion, predicating
much of his dissent upon his reading of Walder, which he interprets
as having a considerably narrower application than the one given it by
the majority. Full weight was afforded by Mr. Justice Brennan to
the fact that in Walder the defendant was impeached as to sweeping
claims in his testimony, i.e. testimonial matters collateral to the case
against him; whereas, in Harris, the defendant was impeached as to
matters in his testimony which directly bore upon the elements of the
crime with which he was charged. Furthermore, as pointed out by
Justice Brennan, the evidence used for impeachment in Walder was related to an earlier 1950 prosecution and had no direct bearing on the
elements of the case being tried in 1952. Justice Brennan believes
these to be the crucial factors distinguishing Harris from Walder, distinctions of such substantive import as to compel a contrary holding in
Harris.8
According to Mr. Justice Brennan, the fifth amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination guarantees to the defendant:
the right to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will. The choice of whether to testify
in one's own defense must therefore be unfettered since that choice
is an exercise of the constitutional privilege.' 9
It is Mr. Justice Brennan's contention that in light of the majority's
holding, a future criminal defendant, when deciding whether or not to
take the stand, will weigh heavily the risk of confrontation with his
prior illegally secured confession. Burdened by the knowledge of the
high risk that his testimony will be impeached by his prior illegally secured statement, the defendant's choice of whether or not to testify
becomes appreciably "fettered". As a result, the fifth amendment's
17.
18.
19.

401 U.S. at 225, 226.
Id. at 227.
401 U.S. at 230.
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privilege is "cut down" by making its assertion costly; the corresponding effect being that the defendant is denied the "fullest" opportunity
to meet the accusation against him.2"
Justice Brennan not only regards the majority's holding as being
constitutionally infirm, but further believes that the Harris decision
will imperil significantly the viability of two objectives of the Miranda
decision, viz. 1) the deterrence of proscribed police activity; and, even
more importantly, 2) the safeguarding of the integrity of our adversary system:
It is abiding truth that 'nothing can destroy a government more
quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard for the charter of its existence'. . . . The Court today tells
the police that they may freely interrogate an accused incommunicado and without counsel and know that although any statement
they obtain in violation of Miranda can't be used in the state's direct case, it may be introduced
if the defendant has the temerity
21
to testify in his own defense.

THE GENESIS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

In any discussion of the exclusionary rule, i.e. the rule which
prohibits the use of illegally obtained evidence in criminal trials, as it
existed before its Miranda extension, it is necessary to distinguish between its two different applications: first, the rule as applied to involuntary confessions; and, second, the rule as applied to physical
evidence seized in an illegal search and seizure.
Illegally Obtained Confessions
The rule, excluding from trials coerced or involuntary confessions,
was initially promulgated in an English case, The King v. Warickshal22
and was subsequently adopted in this country by the United States Supreme Court in Hopt v. Utah.23 Generally referred to as the "confession rule", it was devised as an evidentiary safeguard for the integrity of the fact finding process, because of the belief commonly held
that an induced or coerced confession was untrustworthy and hence unreliable as evidence.24 Consequently, a confession was admissible in
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
(1966).

Id.
401 U.S. at 232.
1 Leach C.L. 263, 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (K.B. 1783).
110 U.S. 574 (1884).
See, Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 935, 954-959
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evidence if it was made voluntarily i.e. free from influences which
made it untrustworthy.
Subsequent to the adoption of the rule in this country, the objective
which the United States Supreme Court sought to realize by imposing
the confession rule's exclusionary sanction underwent a metamorphosis
to the point where suppression of unreliable confessions became a secondary concern subordinate to the aim of barring any police procedure
'2
which "offends the community's sense of fair play and decency. 1
Legal analysts began noting the merging similarity between the "confession rule" and the exclusionary rule which pertained to the physical
products of an illegal search or seizure:
The emphasis in cases such as Rogers26 on presence in the record of claims of coercion has led many courts and commentators
to interpret the exclusionary rule of the Supreme Court confession
cases as analogous to the rule excluding the products of an unlawful search and seizure . . . . The exclusionary rule for confessions, like that in search and seizure cases, is thought to provide
an effective remedy for victims of improper conduct and to deter
improper
interrogations by removing any incentive to engage in
27
them.
Then, in Malloy v. Hogan,2" a state "due process" case, the Supreme
Court in dicta rephrased the voluntariness test into an inquiry of whether
the defendant was "compelled" to give a confession. According to the
Court's opinion in Malloy, whenever the question arose whether a confession is competent as evidence because involuntary, the issue is controlled by the self-incrimination portion of the fifth amendment. This
decision prompted one writer to describe Malloy as a "shotgun wedding
of the privilege [against self-incrimination] to the confessions rule."2 9
Yet Malloy, as it turns out, was a prelude to the formal marriage
ceremony which was performed by the Court in Miranda, which
held that:
[TJhe prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination . . . [viz.
that the defendant was informed of his right to remain silent and
to the presence of retained or appointed counsel and warned that
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
OHIO

Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
Supra, note 24 at 969.
378 U.S. 1 (1964).
Herman, "The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogation", 25
ST. L.J. 449, 465 (1964).
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anything he says may be used against him in a court of law] ....
The defendant may waive effectuation of [his] rights, provided the
30
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.

Physical Evidence Obtained in an Illegal Search
The case of Weeks v. United States3 1 is most frequently cited as the
initial enunciation by the Supreme Court of the rule of exclusion relating to physical products of an unlawful search and seizure. The
Weeks rule was principally aimed at deterring illegal and objectionable
police activity while protecting the fourth amendment right of privacy.3"
In 1920 the Supreme Court extended the Weeks holding and held that
physical evidence which was derivatively obtained through clues furnished by the original products of the illegal search, must also be excluded from trial. 3
It was not until 1961 in Mapp v. Ohio"4 that the Supreme Court
interpreted the fourteenth amendment's due process clause as requiring the Weeks exclusionary rule to be employed in state criminal proceedings. Writing for the majority in Mapp, Mr. Justice Clark called
the Weeks suppression doctrine a "constitutionally required . . . deterrent safeguard without insistence upon which the fourth amendment
'35
would have been reduced to a form of words.
An Exception to the Rule
The exclusionary rule, as thus extended, has been subject to one exception, which was fashioned by the United States Supreme Court in
Walder v. United States. 6 In Walder, the Court upheld a conviction
where the products of an illegal search had been used to impeach the
defendant's credibility as a witness. The defendant, Walder, was indicted in 1952 for the unlawful trafficking in narcotics. At trial Walder
testified on direct examination that he had never sold narcotics to any30. 384 U.S. 444; "It may be conceded that in time of origin the confession-rule
and the self-incrimination rule were widely separated . . . Nevertheless, the kinship
of the two rules is too apparent for denial." C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK LAW OF EVIDENCE, Sec. 75, at 155 (1954).
31. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
32. See 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 772, 774-75 (1967); See generally 25 COL. L. REv. 11
(1925).
In Weeks the court apparently deemed unnecessary the question of the evidence's reliability believing that real proof was not attended by the untrustworthiness
associated with a coerced confession.
33. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
34. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
35. Id. at 648.
36. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
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one in his life nor had he ever illegally possessed narcotics. Over the
defendant's objection the prosecution then questioned Walder about
a heroin capsule unlawfully seized from his home, several years earlier.
(Walder had been indicted for this possession, but his motion to suppress the heroin as seized in violation of the fourth amendment had
been granted and the case was thus dismissed.) The prosecution then
introduced the testimony of an officer who had participated in the unlawful search and seizure of the heroin involved in the earlier proceeding and the chemist who had analyzed it. The evidence obtained by the
original unconstitutional search was introduced solely for the purpose of
impeaching Walder's credibility and not for the purpose of rebuttal.
The Walder Court stated that where the defendant of his own accord, goes beyond a mere denial of complicity in the crimes for which
he is charged and makes sweeping claims, then his credibility may be
37
impeached by evidence inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief.
However, it should be noted that the physical evidence employed for
impeachment purposes in Walder was related to an earlier prosecution
and had no direct bearing on the elements of the case being tried in
1952; furthermore, Walder was impeached as to "sweeping claims in
his testimony," i.e. testimonial matter collateral to the case before the
court.
Notwithstanding, most lower courts subsequent to Walder allowed
impeachment by illegally obtained evidence, even as to testimonial matters related to the case before the court, and tended to disallow impeachment only where the defendant's testimony related directly to matters within the narrow definition of "essential elements of the crime. ' ' 8
Such an application of Walder enlarged appreciably the scope of the
impeachment exception while concurrently limiting the area shielded
from the impeachment sword.
37. Id. at 65. Since impeachment of the defendant's direct testimony was at
issue in Walder, the Walder Court reasoned that Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S.

20 (1925), which held that the prosecution could not introduce evidence to rebut a defendant's response on cross-examination, was distinguishable. Thus, Walder recognizes a distinction between impeachment and rebuttal, i.e. impeachment is the act

of discrediting a party's integrity as a witness; whereas, rebuttal is the act of introducing evidence to disprove facts testified to by the adverse party.
38. Elements of the crime consist only of the prescribed act or acts and intent or
knowledge, and such matters as motive or presence at the scene of the crime do not
constitute elements. See e.g. Tate v. United States, 283 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
United States v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1966). It is ironical that Chief Justice
Burger, while a judge on the D.C. Circuit urged that an illegally obtained pre-trial
statement only be allowed to impeach the defendant's testimony relating to matters
collateral to the "elements of the crime". See the opinion of Judge (now Chief Justice)
Burger in Tate v. United States, supra.
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Similarly, although Walder involved evidence acquired in a search
relating to a separate prosecution, lower courts prior to Harris generally held that evidence obtained in an investigation of, and directly relating to, the offense presently being tried may also be used to impeach
testimony as to collateral matters."
The other notable extension of the Walder impeachment exception
occurred in connection with pre-trial confessions. In Tate v. United
States,40 a statement made to police in a period of "unnecessary delay"
between arrest and preliminary hearing, and thus inadmissible in the
prosecution's case-in-chief41 was permitted on authority of Walder, to be
used to impeach the defendant's credibility as a witness, as to testimonial matters collateral to elements of the crime.
When in 1966 the Supreme Court in Miranda held that a confession
taken by police in a custodial interrogation was inadmissible unless
the accused was advised of his constitutional rights prior to interrogation, the question arose whether the Walder impeachment exception
applied to such a confession.
Most of the state and lower federal courts which faced this issue
concluded that the impeachment exception was not applicable to a confession obtained without the benefit of the Miranda warnings. 4 - Yet
this interpretation lacked unanimous appeal and several courts insisted that the Walder impeachment exception, applying to collateral
testimony, was as applicable to confessions excluded from the main
' 43
case by Mirandaas it was to other types of "suppressed evidence.
These contrary holdings perhaps motivated the Supreme Court to consider the question in Harris, where it determined that a confession, otherwise inadmissible on the authority of Miranda, could constitutionally
be utilized to discredit the defendant's credibility even as to testimony
directly related to elements of the crime (provided that the confession's trustworthiness satisfies legal standards).
HarrisAND

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

In Miranda the Supreme Court asserted that compulsion was inher39. See 283 F.2d 377.
40. 283 F.2d 377.
41. See Rule 5(a), Fed. R. Crim. P., 18 U.S.C.A.
42. See, e.g., Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1968); and State v.
Brewton, 247 Ore. 241, 422 P.2d 581 (1967).
43. See, e.g., People v. Kulis, 18 N.Y.2d 318, 221 N.E.2d 541, 274 N.Y.S.2d 873
(1966); State v. Kimbrough, 109 N.J. Super. 57, 262 A.2d 232 (1970); Acuff v.
United States, 410 F.2d 463 (6th Cir. 1969).
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ent in custodial surroundings and determined that no statement obtained from the accused "can truly be the product of his free choice"
unless he was first warned that he has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says may be used against him, that he has the right to
presence of counsel, and then elected to waive these rights.4 4 That is
to say, the Miranda Court deemed all statements made by an accused
without having first been informed of his rights to have been "compelled".4 5 Accordingly, Miranda held that a confession so obtained
must be excluded from trial since the fifth amendment provides that
no person "shall be compelled to be a witness against himself."
Accepting the validity of Miranda's reasoning, arguendo, it would
logically follow that the use for impeachment purposes of a confession obtained without the benefit of the "Miranda warnings" should
be as constitutionally infirm as when used in the proscution's case-inchief, for in each situation the defendant is "compelled" (as the word
is interpreted by Miranda) to be a witness against himself.
Notwithstanding, the Supreme Court's position in Harris appears to
be that, regardless of whether the Miranda warnings were issued, if
the confession is given "voluntarily," in the traditional sense of the
term,4 6 then use of such a confession for purposes of impeachment is
not tantamount to compelling the accused to be a witness against
himself; therefore, such use is not prohibited by the fifth amendment's
mandate.
44. 384 U.S. at 458.
45. According to Justice Harlan in his Miranda dissent, "the aim in short is toward
voluntariness in a utopian sense, or to view it from a different angle, voluntariness with
a vengeance." 384 U.S. at 505.
46. A confession may be admitted for purposes of impeachment according to Harris, if it meets legal standards of trustworthiness. Since the conventional view is that
only a "voluntary" confession is able to muster up to legal standards of trustworthiness,
by implication the requirement of voluntariness is retained for admissibility under the
impeachment exception. However, in this context, it is perfectly clear, after Harris,
that the voluntariness question need not be answered by using the objective criteria as
set forth in Miranda. See Alesi v. Craven, 440 F.2d 975 (9th Cir. 1971), a case decided
subsequent to Harris where the court used the pre-Miranda "totality of the circumstances-voluntariness" test for determining the admissibility of a confession under the
impeachment exception.
47. Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 amends
existing legislation by adding 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3501, which purports to "repeal" Miranda
in federal prosecutions. The Act states that a confession is admissible in the federal
courts if voluntarily given, and that whether the defendant was advised of his right to
remain silent or his right to counsel and whether he was without counsel when he confessed are merely to be taken into consideration as circumstances bearing on the issue
of voluntariness.
If viewed as a total "repeal" of Miranda, this statute is quite
clearly unconstitutional, for rights derived from the Constitution cannot be repealed
by legislation. However, in support of this legislation it has been noted that the Miranda Court indicated Congress might devise equally effective safeguards for protecting
the privilege, and the argument is made that Title 11 does this by a less rigid formula
than Miranda, permitting a confession to be used where a less than perfect warning was
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As noted by one commentator, Harris thus creates an anomalous
"double standard of admissibility" for confessions.4s Before a confession may be used in the prosecution's case-in-chief, even after the Harris decision, it would still be necessary for the prosecution to demonstrate that the interrogation which produced the confession was held in
compliance with the criteria set forth in Miranda, viz. that the defendant was informed of his rights prior to interrogation and that he
elected to waive them.
But when determining the admissibility of a confession under the
impeachment exception, apparently courts may revert back to using
the pre-Mirandatest which considers the "totality of the circumstances"
surrounding the confession to determine whether it was made voluntarily.
Although not constitutionally required, a two-tier test for determining "voluntariness" under the fifth amendment may be viewed as a judicial compromise to the total exclusion of statements acquired without
the Miranda warnings; a safeguard which prevents the defendant from
affirmatively resorting to perjurious testimony in reliance on the government's disability to challenge his credibility.
Unlike the objective criteria for determining "voluntariness" which
Miranda announced, the "totality of the circumstances-voluntariness"
test will necessitate a laborious case-by-case scrutiny of the facts in order to determine whether or not the confession is admissible. As
pointed out by one observer, this case-by-case determination of the reliability-voluntariness question in cases where the prosecution takes advantage of the impeachment exception "immerses the courts in the very
task which Mirandawas designed to obviate."4 9
However, according to Justice Harlan in his Miranda dissent such
an approach to admissibility is highly commendatory:
With over 25 years of precedent the Court has developed an
elaborate, sophisticated, and sensitive approach to admissibility
of confessions. It is "judicial" in its treatment of one case at a
time . . . flexible in its ability to respond to the endless mutations
of fact presented, and even more familiar to the lower courts. 50
given or a less than conclusive waiver was obtained. Since the Harris Court has retreated from Miranda's rigid test with respect to admissibility under the impeachment
exception speculation arises regarding Miranda's future in light of the Omnibus Crime
legislation.
48. 11 SANTA CLARA LAW R. 440, 445 (1971).
49.
REV.

50.

See "The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rules", 34 U. CI. L.

939, 948 (1967).

384 U.S. at 508; But see Kamisar, "A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents:
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As to Mr. Justice Brennan's contention in Harris, that use by the
prosecution of a tainted statement to impeach the accused who has the
"temerity" to take the stand "cuts down on the constitutional privilege
[to testify in one's own defense] by making its assertion costly,"'" the
Chief Justice counters:
Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so. But that5privilege
cannot be construed
2
to include the right to commit perjury.
This admonition by the Chief Justice was quoted with favor by the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Ramirez.5"
There the defendant, Ramirez, had taken the stand and on direct
examination told that he was coerced into selling heroin by strangers
from Mexico who kept him and his family under constant threat of
harm.
On the authority of Harris, the court of appeals upheld the prosecution's right on cross-examination to impeach the credibility of the defendant's story by questioning the defendant about remaining silent
during his arrest, i.e. if actually under duress and fearful for his family's safety, why did he, Ramirez, not inform the police of such a dangerous situation upon being apprehended?
The propriety of such an extension of Harris is, indeed, questionable since the viability of the constitutional privilege to remain silent
after arrest is -unlikely if a penalty is to be imposed on those individuals
who choose to exercise the privilege. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit's
application of Harris in the Ramirez case apparently did not "shock"
54
the Supreme Court since certiorari was denied.
How HarrisAFFECTS THE POLICE
Mr. Justice Brennan, in dissent, further criticised the Harris decision
for "undoing much of the progress made in conforming police methods to the constitution."5 5 Justice Brennan was fearful that an impeachment exception to the Miranda rule of exclusion would seriously
undermine the objective of deterring police practices in disregard of
the constitution. He reasoned that police would first illegally question
the accused in the hopes of obtaining impeachment evidence. Only
Some Comments on the 'New' Fifth Amendment and the Old 'Voluntariness Test",
65 MICH. L. REv. 59 (1967).

51.
52.

53.
54.
55.

180

401 U.S. at 230.
Id. at 225.

441 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1971).
40 U.S. Law Week 3166 (1971).
401 U.S. at 232.
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after illiciting such a confession would they then administer the Miranda warnings, in the hopes of gaining a second confession which may
be admissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief. Such chicanery was
predicted not only by Justice Brennan in Harris, but prior to the Harris
decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 56 According to Judge
Ely of the Ninth Circuit, "if authorized to do so, [police] could not
fairly be criticized for conducting unconstitutional interrogations designed to elicit possible impeachment evidence.

'5 7

The Harris majority viewed the matter differently, however, and was
of the opinion that the "benefits of the [impeachment] process should
not be lost . . . because of the speculative possibility that impermissi-

ble police conduct will be encouraged thereby." '
Implicit in such language is an abjuration by the Court of what Justice White had once referred to as "a deep-seated distrust of law enforcement officers, everywhere." 59 Thus, Harris may forecast a more
"amiable" relationship for the future between the Court and the police.
THE JURY'S USE OF IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE

After the Harris decision, if the defendant chooses to take the stand
and testify in his own defense, the prosecution may then read to the
jury those portions of an illegally elicited confession, made to police
prior to the trial, which contradict testimony6 ° of the defendant's (provided, of course, that the confession was made voluntarily). The defendant is entitled to an instruction by the court informing the jury that
they must consider the confession only for the purpose of determining
the defendant-witness' credibility and not for the purpose of deciding
either the issue of the defendant's guilt or the truth of a fact as to which
the defendant has testified.
In remarking on this facet of the Harris decision, the Wall Street
Journalnoted:
Such distinctions may be meaningful to lawyers and judges, but
it's likely to mean little to juries, no matter how well instructed by
the courts. 61
56. See Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172, 180 (9th Cir. 1960).
57. Id.
58. 401 U.S. at 225.
59. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. at 498 (1964) (White dissenting).
60. See People v. Johnson, 27 N.Y.2d 119, 261 N.E.2d 644, 313 N.Y.S.2d 728
(1970), where the court held it proper for the prosecution to refer to matters in the
prior statement to which the defendant had not testified during direct examination.
The court stated that if the defendant's testimony developed his "version" of the events
dealt with in the prior statement, then the prosecution was free to use such statement
to impeach him.
61. The Wall Street Journal, Mar. 2, 1971.
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The practical result may very well be that evidence, though theoretically inadmissible on the issue of the defendant's guilt or the truth of a
particular fact, sneaks in through the back door which is held ajar by
the impeachment exception and is employed by juries for these very
6
proscribed purposes. 1
Harris'IMPACT ON Walder
It would be possible to confine the Harris holding to its own narrow
factual situation, i.e., to where a confession is obtained without advising the accused of his right to appointed counsel. However, such a limited application of Harris is not warranted by any language in Chief
Justice Burger's opinion, and it therefore seems improbable that such
a restrictive interpretation will follow. It is more likely that the courts
will expend their energies answering the question, whether the. Harris
holding, while in the process of revitalizing the Walder decision has
in fact enlarged the scope of that decision.
It should be recalled that Walder was impeached as to "collateral
matters" in his direct testimony by impeachment evidence acquired in
a search relating to an earlier separate prosecution; whereas, in Harris the impeachment evidence, viz. a confession, was obtained during the investigation of the very case being tried, and the confession was
used to impeach Harris as to testimony which directly related to an essential element of the crime. However, these distinctions did not persuade the Harris majority that a different principle was involved and
accordingly, Walder was cited as controlling.63 If, as the Harris Court
implies, the collateral-direct distinction creates no difference in principle, one may surmise that Walder and Harris taken together are now
authority for the proposition that real proof obtained in the investigation of the very case being tried, either immediately in an illegal search
and seizure, or derivatively from the clues furnished by the original
products of the illegal search, may be utilized to impeach testimony on
matters directly related to elements of the crime with which the defendant is charged. Yet, when used to impeach the defendant's testimony, physical evidence, owing to its tangibility, is more likely to
leave a prejudicial impression upon the minds of jurors than a prior
confession and it is highly improbable that a curative instruction can
expunge the prejudicial effect or limit the jury's consideration of such
62. See C. MCCORMICK supra, note 30, Sec. 39 at 77; See generally 133 A.L.R. 1454,
1466 (1941).
63. 401 U.S. at 224.
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evidence to the issue of credibility. 64 It seems that such an extension of
the impeachment exception as it pertains to physical evidence may so
undermine the fourth amendment's suppression doctrine as to nearly
render moot Chief Justice Burger's suggestion that it be overturned.6 5
The practical effect, of course, is that defendants will shy away from
66
the witness stand as a precaution against being impeached.
CONCLUSION

As expressed by one analyst:
In balancing the desirability of insuring that perjury does not go
unimpeached against maintaining absolute deterrence
and govern67
mental integrity, no clear cut conclusion appears.
On one side of the scale is the interest society has in ascertaining the
truth of the charges against the defendant. On the other side are the
constitutional rights and privileges which are guaranteed to the criminally accused and the "social need that law shall not be flouted by
the insolence of officers."6 8
The Court in Harris perhaps believed that a striking of the balance
between the interests of society and the rights of the accused required
a holding that a confession which meets legal standards of trustworthiness be admissible for purposes of impeachment, and that a contrary
position would, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, "give protection to the
rights of an individual while causing a disproportionate loss of protection for society."6' 9
RONALD

V. HIRST

64. See text accompanying note 65. Physical evidence would have little difficulty
meeting Harris standards for admissibility under the impeachment exception, i.e. does
the evidence meet legal standards of trustworthiness? See n.32.

65.

See Bivens v. Six Unknown of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388

(1971). (Burger dissenting). In the words of the Chief Justice, "Instead of continuing
to enforce the Suppression Doctrine, inflexibly, rigidly, and mechanically, we should
view it as one of the great experimental steps in the Common Law and acknowledge its
shortcomings. But in the same spirit we should be prepared to discontinue what the experience of over half a century has shown neither deters errant officers nor affords a
remedy to the totally innocent victims of official misconduct." See also Burger, Who
Will Watch the Watchman? 14 A.M.U. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1964).
66. See 501 U.S. at 230.
67. Supra, note 49.
68. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, 589 (1926).
69. Id.

